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Abstract 
This paper studies racial and ethnic discrimination in discrete choices by real estate 
brokers using national audit data from the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study.  It uses a fixed-
effects logit model to estimate the probability that discrimination occurs and to study the causes 
of discrimination.  The data set makes it possible to control for auditors’ actual demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, along with the characteristics assigned for the purposes of the 
audit.  The study finds that discrimination continues to be strong but also documents a downward 
trend in both the scope and incidence of discrimination since 1989.  The estimations also identify 
both brokers’ prejudice and white customers’ prejudice as causes of discrimination. 
(JEL J71, R31) 
 
Keywords: housing discrimination, audit, fixed-effects logit 
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Introduction 
In 2003, the homeownership rate was 75.4 percent for non-Hispanic whites, but only 48.8 
percent for blacks and 46.7 percent for Hispanics (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2004).1  Many researchers believe that these disparities arise in part because of 
housing discrimination, which is defined as systematic unfavorable treatment of minorities. 
Several studies based upon national audit data from the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study 
(HDS 1989) find evidence of widespread discrimination. The 2000 Housing Discrimination 
Study (HDS 2000), which updates and improves upon the earlier study, provides a unique 
opportunity to determine whether this type of discrimination persists.2  This study also may shed 
light on the effectiveness of the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, which gave the 
federal government stronger law-enforcement powers to fight discrimination (see Yinger 1995). 
This paper addresses the following four questions: Does discrimination persist in the 
housing sales market? If so, how high is the discrimination level? Has discrimination increased 
or decreased over the last decade? What are the causes of discrimination?  Following the 
literature, a fixed-effects logit model is applied to the HDS 2000 data to study discrete choices 
by real estate brokers, such as whether to tell the auditor that the advertised unit was available. 
HDS 2000 has a feature not found in previous audit studies: it recorded some of the auditors’ 
actual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as income and education. As a result, 
this paper explicitly controls for an auditor’s actual traits, as well as the characteristics assigned 
for the purpose of the audit. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the existing evidence on housing 
discrimination based upon the HDS 1989 data. Section 3 describes the HDS 2000 design. The 
next two sections explain the fixed-effects logit model and data. Sections 6 and 7 test the 
hypothesis that discrimination exists and measure the discrimination level, respectively. Section 
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8 compares the HDS 2000 results with the HDS 1989 results (Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger 
1998).  The next two sections present and test hypotheses about the sources of discrimination. 
The final section summarizes the results. 
 
Existing Evidence on Housing Discrimination 
Several recent studies of housing discrimination are based on data from HDS 1989.  
Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) use data from the sales audits to examine discrimination in 
qualitative actions taken by real estate brokers. This is the first paper to employ the fixed-effects 
logit model to control for the audit-specific fixed effects. They find evidence of discrimination in 
the housing sales market and evidence that brokers’ prejudice and white customers’ prejudice are 
the causes of this discrimination.3 
Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (2003) explore brokers’ decisions to show a unit to the white 
auditor, to the black auditor, or to both.  They estimate a multinomial logit model and find that 
agents discriminate and, in suburban areas, practice redlining, defined as withholding units in 
integrated neighborhoods from all home seekers. They also discover that brokers appear to 
practice statistical discrimination, defined as treating blacks less favorably based on unfounded 
stereotypes about their creditworthiness or neighborhood preferences. 
Page (1995) uses a fixed-effects Poisson model to test for discrimination in the number of 
housing units shown to whites and minorities by housing agents. She finds that blacks and 
Hispanics are shown between 10 and 20 percent fewer units than their white teammates.  Her 
analysis also indicates that statistical discrimination and white customers’ prejudice are the major 
sources of discrimination. 
Yinger (1995) shows that an analysis of discrimination in the number of units shown 
needs to account for an agent’s opportunity to discriminate, defined as (his or) her access to 
available housing units.4   With controls for the opportunity to discriminate in the analysis, 
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Yinger finds evidence that housing agents discriminate to protect their business with prejudiced 
white clients and on the basis of stereotypes about black and Hispanic customers.    
Audit studies provide a powerful test for discrimination, but they are not a controlled 
experiment.  Despite the efforts of project managers, audit teammates might differ on traits that 
affect their treatment.5  Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998) emphasize that 
unobserved auditor characteristics could bias estimates of discrimination in either direction.  To 
address this problem, this paper explicitly controls for several true auditor characteristics.6 
 
The Design of the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study   
HDS 2000 is an audit study aimed at determining whether minority homebuyers continue 
to encounter discriminatory treatment at the end of the 20th century.7  It follows the basic design 
of HDS 1989 with a few changes in auditors’ assigned characteristics and treatment questions.8 
Four minority groups are studied, including black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American. This 
paper focuses on the black/white and Hispanic/non-Hispanic-white (henceforth Hispanic/white, 
for short) audits. In the Hispanic/white audits, all minority auditors have Hispanic surnames, but 
they differ in skin color and accent. 
HDS 2000 sampled 20 metropolitan areas, including 16 sites for the black/white audits 
and 10 sites for the Hispanic/white audits. 9   Overall, 1,060 black/white audits and 724 
Hispanic/white audits were conducted between May 2000 and January 2001.  Each audit was 
conducted by a pair of auditors, one non-Hispanic white and one minority, who were matched by 
gender and age.10 They were assigned the same socioeconomic characteristics, such as marital 
status, family size, and income, to ensure that they were equally qualified for buying an 
advertised house.11  Teammates also received the same training on how to behave in front of 
brokers.  To the extent possible, in other words, the white and minority auditors were made to be 
identical in the agent’s eyes except for their race or ethnicity. The audit manager randomly chose 
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a housing advertisement in a major local Sunday newspaper.12  Then audit teammates were sent 
to inquire about this advertisement within a short time period. After her visit, each auditor 
reported on the information she received from the agent and how she was treated. 
Unlike HDS 1989, HDS 2000 collected extensive information on each auditor’s true 
characteristics, such as income, education, current tenure status, and auditing experience. This 
type of data gives us the ability to control for differences in teammates’ true traits.  
As in the case of previous audit studies, results from HDS 2000 must be interpreted with 
care.  Because newspaper advertisements form the sampling frame, the results presented here 
should be interpreted as a measure of discrimination that eligible minorities might come across 
when they ask about the units advertised in the major local newspapers.  Discrimination could be 
higher or lower under other circumstances (and at different stages of a housing transaction). 
 
The Fixed-Effects Logit Model 
This paper uses a fixed-effects logit model as the econometric framework.  The model 
was developed by Chamberlain (1980) as a conditional logit that accounts for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in a panel setting.  Chamberlain’s fixed-effects logit method has been used by 
Whittington (1992), Christian, Gupta, and Lin (1993), Korenman and Winship (1995), Fisman 
and Raturi (2003), and Anderson and Newell (2004).  Yinger (1986) first points out that in fair 
housing audits, teammates could share some unobserved factors because they are assigned the 
same socioeconomic characteristics, go through the same training, and visit the same agency to 
inquire about the same advertised unit. If these common unobserved factors are correlated with 
right-hand-side variables, estimation results will be biased. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998, 
1999) show that the fixed-effects logit model can be used to correct the potential bias in the case 
of qualitative dependent variables, such as whether the auditor was told that the advertised unit 
was available. Following their studies, this paper focuses exclusively on qualitative dependent 
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variables and therefore ignores important quantitative broker’s actions, such as how many units 
were shown to each auditor.  
A broker’s decision about the treatment of a potential homebuyer can be represented by 
the following equation: 
 
                             Pr( 1| , , , , , ) ( )ij i ij ij ij ij iY W X f W X W Xδ β γ α δ β γ α= = + + + ,                         (1) 
  
where ijY  = 1 stands for favorable treatment, f is assumed to be a logistic distribution function, i 
is the audit index, j is the visit index, ijW  equals 1 for the white auditor and 0 for the minority 
auditor, iα  represents the audit-specific fixed effect, and ijX  is a vector of explanatory variables 
that will be defined later. Although the order in which the white and minority auditors visited the 
agency was random, it simplifies the discussion to associate visit index value 1 with the white 
auditor and visit index value 0 with the minority auditor. This association of the visit index 
values is made throughout the discussion below. 
In a fixed-effects logit model, iα  is removed from the probability function, conditional 
on the sum of ijY .  The conditional probability function can be expressed by 
 
( )* *1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1Pr( 1| 1, , , , , ) ( )i i i i i i i i iY Y Y Y X X f X X Xδ β γ δ β γ− = + = = + − + .                    (2) 
 
In an application of equation (2) to audit data, only a subset of the explanatory variables 
(identified with an asterisk) appears in 
1 0
* *( )
i i
X X− , because most of the X ‘s are assigned to be 
equal across teammates.  The conditioning on the sum of outcomes substantially reduces the 
sample size.  Only the audits in which teammates are treated differently stay in the final 
subsample for the regression, but Chamberlain (1980) proves that this approach yields consistent 
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estimates of the population parameters subject to mild restrictions on the rate at which the 
sequence of  iα ‘s is allowed to become unbounded.   
Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) show that the estimate of discrimination can be 
interpreted as a national average estimate if the interaction terms are expressed as deviations 
from the (nationally representative) sample averages. With this refinement, equation (2) becomes:  
 
( )* *1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1Pr( 1| 1, , , , , ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i w w i i iY Y Y Y X X f X X X Xδ β γ δ β γ− = + = = + − + − ,         (3) 
 
where 1X  is the weighted national mean of 1iX  and wδ  = 1Xδ γ+ .
13 With this formulation, wδ  
captures any systematic difference in treatment across teammates that arises even if white and 
minority auditors are identical, i.e., 1 0i iX X= , and the white auditor is an average homebuyer, i.e., 
1 1iX X= .  This difference can be interpreted as a measure of racial or ethnic discrimination, so a 
significance test for wδ  is a test of the null hypothesis that no discrimination exists.
14  In addition, 
elements of γ indicate whether the impact of minority status on treatment varies with X , and, as 
we will see, provide tests of hypotheses about the causes of discrimination.  
In this logit model, wδ  shows the impact of minority status on the log odds of favorable 
treatment and therefore does not directly indicate the probability of discrimination.  Under the 
assumptions of 1 0i iX X=  and 1 1, wiX X e
δ=  is equal to the ratio of the white and minority odds of 
favorable treatment, ,R  defined as R 1 1
w m
w m
P P
P P
=
− −
, where andw mP P  represent the probabilities 
of favorable treatment of the white and minority auditors, respectively.  One way to interpret the 
magnitude of the odds-ratio measure, wδ , is to translate it into a probability measure using the 
assumption that mP  falls short of wP  by a fixed amount, d, which is called a fixed absolute gap 
(Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger 1998).15  This gap is given by d = 
)1(
)1)(1(
ww
ww
PRP
PRP
−+
−− .   
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Data 
This paper studies a variety of brokers’ discrete choices in three broad categories. The 
first category is related to housing availability, including whether the advertised unit was 
available, whether similar units were available, whether the advertised unit was shown, whether 
similar units were shown, whether more units were recommended to an auditor than to her 
teammate, and whether more units were shown to an auditor than to her teammate.16 These 
variables reflect crucial treatments in which discrimination directly blocks minority access to 
housing.  The second category indicates whether the broker made an effort to speed the sale of a 
housing unit to the auditor. Two variables, namely, whether the broker told the auditor that she 
was qualified to buy a home and whether the agent made a follow-up contact, belong to this 
group.17 The last category is about financing assistance, including whether the agent volunteered 
to help the auditor find financing, whether the agent discussed downpayment, whether the agent 
pre-qualified the auditor for financing, and whether the agent suggested lenders.  Compared with 
Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998), this paper examines three new variables in housing 
availability (similar units available, more units recommended, and more units shown), three new 
variables in financing assistance (downpayment discussed, pre-qualified buyer for financing, and 
lenders suggested), and one new variable in sales effort (qualified auditor for buying).18  
Tables 1 and 2 present the incidence of treatments, with no statistical controls, for the 
black/white and Hispanic/white audits, respectively. In each table, the first two entries are the 
weighted shares of audits in which favorable action was taken for whites and for minorities, 
respectively. The final entry records the difference between these two shares, often called the net 
incidence of unfavorable treatment. For the black/white audits, all net incidence measures are 
positive, ranging from 0.007 (or 0.7 percent) for advertised unit available to 0.125 for more units 
shown. For the Hispanic/white audits, all net incidence measures are positive except for 
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advertised unit available, advertised unit inspected, and more units shown.  The other net 
incidence values fall between 0.011 for follow-up contact made and 0.111 for financial help 
offered.   
Table 3 lists the explanatory variables in our data set.  These variables can be classified 
into four groups: basic variables, auditors’ true characteristics, month and site dummies, and 
neighborhood characteristics for the advertised unit.  Each of these groups can be entered as a 
difference between teammates ( * *1 0( )i iX X−  in equation (3)) or as the value for the white 
teammate relative to the national average ( 1 1( )iX X−  in equation (3)).  The first versions of these 
variables insulate the estimates of discrimination from bias due to differences in observable 
teammate characteristics; the second versions help test hypotheses about the causes of 
discrimination. The links to such hypotheses are explained in Section 9. 
The basic variables include auditor characteristics, such as age, sex, and assigned income; 
agent characteristics such as race, sex, and age; and agency characteristics, such as whether a 
multiple listing service was used.  True characteristics cover the auditor’s actual socioeconomic 
information along with home seeking and auditing experience. The socioeconomic information 
includes income, education, employment, and immigration status. Three dummy variables 
indicate the auditor’s home seeking experience, including whether she lived in the audit 
metropolitan area, whether she was a homeowner, and whether she was actually hunting for a 
home.  Neighborhood characteristics include racial and ethnic composition, median house value, 
per capita income, and percentage of owner-occupied housing units for the census tract in which 
the advertised unit was located.19 
Differences between teammates in their actual characteristics might affect differences in 
their treatment, so an analysis that controls for these differences might paint a different picture of 
unfavorable treatment than the simple percentages in Tables 1 and 2.  An auditor with experience 
in home seeking might be treated better, for example, because she knows more about the local 
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housing market and the buying process and can ask better questions.  Auditing experience may 
help the auditor present herself in a more professional way and may also lead to better treatment. 
The addition of these variables therefore represents a significant advance over Ondrich, Stricker, 
and Yinger (1998).  Although the explanatory variables other than the auditor’s true 
characteristics are similar to those in Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998), we also add three 
new neighborhood characteristics (median house value, per capita income, and percentage of 
owner-occupied housing units) and one new agency characteristic (whether the agency used the 
Internet). 20 
Audit teammates shared assigned factors but differed in their true characteristics and in 
the characteristics of the agents they encountered.   Tables 4 and 5 provide information on the 
magnitude of these differences.  Table 4 shows that, compared with their teammates, black 
auditors had higher actual incomes, and higher probabilities of having a job and of actually 
hunting for a home, while white auditors had more education and were more likely to live in the 
audit metropolitan area.  Table 5 shows that compared with their teammates, Hispanic auditors 
also had higher actual incomes and a higher probability of being employed, while white auditors 
had more education and were more likely to be homeowners.  It also demonstrates that 20 
percent of Hispanic auditors had a discernible accent and that the difference in darkness of skin 
tone between Hispanics and whites is significant.  Overall, white and minority teammates did not 
encounter agents with significantly different characteristics, but they did differ on several true 
characteristics—differences that need to be considered in estimating discrimination. 
 
Testing the Hypothesis that Discrimination Exists 
Our first major question is:  “Does housing discrimination exist?”  The answer to this 
question is affirmative if the estimated wδ  in equation (3) is positive and statistically significant.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation results for each type of treatment for the black/white and 
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Hispanic/white audits, respectively.  The first column of each table is the number of observations, 
that is, the number of audits in which teammates were treated differently.  Other entries are the 
estimated values of wδ  with different sets of explanatory variables.  The first estimates (in the 
second column) are based on regressions with the basic variables, entered as both the difference 
in the variable between teammates and the value for the white auditor (relative to the national 
mean). The estimates in the third column add differences in audit teammates’ true characteristics; 
when compared with the estimates in the second column, these estimates indicate whether the 
inclusion of these differences alters the estimate of wδ .  The estimates in the fourth column add 
white auditors’ true characteristics (expressed as a deviation from the weighted sample mean).  
The other columns are based on regressions that successively add month and site dummies, and 
neighborhood characteristics, all interacted with race variable and expressed as deviations from 
the national average.  Once added, each block of variables is retained in subsequent columns. 
Any estimate with a p-value below 5 percent for a two-tailed test is regarded as statistically 
significant.  
First, consider the estimates of wδ  in the last column of Table 6, which we believe are the 
most reliable estimates. For the black/white audits, in the category of housing availability, ˆwδ  is 
positive and significant for similar units inspected, more units recommended, and more units 
shown. Discrimination is also found in sales effort for qualified auditor for buying and in 
financing assistance for downpayment discussed and pre-qualified buyer for financing. 
Most of these results for the black/white audits are robust to changes in the explanatory 
variables.  The six significant estimates of wδ  in the last column also have the p-values below 5 
percent in all previous columns.  For these variables, the estimated magnitudes are larger in the 
last column than in the second column for every result except for more units recommended; that 
is, adding controls tends to raise the estimated level of discrimination.  In contrast, the addition 
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of differences in teammates’ true characteristics (that is, moving from the second column to the 
third column) raises the p-value from below 5 percent to above 5 percent in two cases:  similar 
units available and follow-up contact made.  For these variables, a failure to observe these 
variables could lead to an overstatement of the magnitude and statistical significance of 
discrimination.21  
For the Hispanic/white audits, we find less evidence of discrimination.  No estimate of 
wδ  in the last column of Table 7 is significant for a variable describing housing availability or 
sales effort.  In the category of financing assistance, ˆwδ  is positive and significant for financial 
help offered and lenders suggested.  The result for downpayment discussed is significant at the 
two-tailed 10 percent level, which provides weak evidence of discrimination. 
The results for financial help offered and lenders suggested are quite robust across 
specifications, but some other results are strongly affected by the addition of controls.  Adding 
differences in teammates’ true characteristics pushes the p-values for two variables, namely, 
similar units available and pre-qualified buyer for financing, from below 5 percent to above 5 
percent, and the addition of other variables raises these p-values even more.  Another variable, 
follow-up contact made, almost becomes significant when teammate differences in true 
characteristics are included (with a p-value of 5.1 percent), but it is not close to significant in a 
regression that includes all the explanatory variables.  Moreover, the result for downpayment 
discussed, which is highly significant with basic variables, is not affected by the inclusion of 
teammate differences but has a p-value of only 8.2 percent in the final column.  These results 
remind us that controls for differences in auditors’ true characteristics can shift the results in 
either direction and that other controls are needed, as well.  
Overall, the results demonstrate the continuing existence of housing discrimination.  
Blacks face discrimination in a wide range of agents’ actions, whereas Hispanics are treated 
unfairly with regard to financing assistance.  For the most part, brokers do not block minorities 
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from gaining access to the advertised units, but they continue to take discriminatory actions in 
recommending and showing similar units. This may reflect the behavior, documented by Ondrich, 
Ross, and Yinger (2003), that brokers advertise the units they are most willing to sell to 
minorities while strictly controlling other houses.  
 
The Probability of Discrimination  
Our next question concerns the probability that a minority home seeker encounters 
discrimination.  Tables 8 and 9 present the probability measures derived earlier for the subset of 
agent’s actions involving discrimination (as indicated by a positive and significant ˆwδ ) for the 
black/white and Hispanic/white audits, respectively.  In each table, the first entry reports the 
simple net incidence measure with no controls, which is copied from Table 1 or 2, and the 
second entry shows the fixed absolute gap measure.  
The results for the black/white audits in Table 8 indicate that the estimated fixed absolute 
gap ranges from 14.6 percent (similar units inspected) to 39.5 percent (pre-qualified buyer for 
financing). Except in the case of similar units inspected, the estimates are always above 25 
percent, which shows that blacks still face a disturbingly high probability of encountering 
discrimination for a wide range of brokers’ actions.  These results also indicate that the 
multivariate estimate of the probability of discrimination significantly exceeds the simple net 
incidence measure for all agents’ actions.  
Table 9 presents the results for three dependent variables for the Hispanic/white audits. 
The fixed absolute gap ranges from 10.8 percent (downpayment discussed) to 33.0 percent 
(financial help offered).  These results indicate that Hispanic home seekers face a probability 
above 10 percent of encountering discrimination in several aspects of financial assistance 
provided by brokers.  Moreover, as in the case of the black/white audits, adding statistical 
controls raises the estimated probability of discrimination.   
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The Trend in Discrimination 
Comparing the results for HDS 2000 and HDS 1989 sheds light on the trend in 
discrimination over the last decade.  This paper and Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) have 
five dependent variables in common, including advertised unit available, advertised unit 
inspected, similar units inspected, follow-up contact made, and financial help offered.  These 
variables provide an overview of treatments concerning housing availability, sales effort, and 
financing assistance.  The results from the two studies are comparable because they are based on 
similar data collection efforts and the same econometric methodology.  
Tables 10 and 11 present the comparison results for the black/white and Hispanic/white 
audits, respectively. As discussed earlier, the existence of discrimination is indicated by the 
significant coefficient estimate for wδ . For the black/white audits, the 1989 study uncovers 
discrimination in all types of broker’s actions while the 2000 study only finds one significant 
result, for similar units inspected. For the Hispanic/white audits, the 1989 study has significant 
ˆ
wδ  for all dependent variables except for financial help offered, which is the only variable for 
which this paper finds discrimination. 
Discrimination obviously appears in fewer types of brokers’ actions in 2000 than in 1989, 
which signals that the scope of discrimination has declined.  It is particularly noteworthy that 
brokers appear to have stopped practicing the most direct form of discrimination, namely, 
discrimination in showing the advertised unit.  Nevertheless, brokers continue to discriminate in 
showing similar units and they appear to have picked up a new type of discrimination against 
Hispanics, namely, in providing financing help.  These conclusions are based, of course, only on 
the five common dependent variables and might not apply to a broader set of agents’ actions.  
Tables 10 and 11 also compare the estimated probabilities of discrimination for HDS 
2000 and HDS 1989.  Table 10 reveals a broad pattern of decline in the discrimination level for 
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the black/white audits.  The drop in the simple net incidence measure ranges from 2.2 percentage 
points (advertised unit inspected) to 10.1 percentage points (financial help offered). The decrease 
in the fixed absolute gap measure is between 6.9 percentage points (follow-up contact made) and 
11.2 percentage points (advertised unit available).  In one case (similar units inspected), 
however, the fixed absolute gap measure actually increases by 0.9 percentage points.   
As shown in Table 11, Hispanic home seekers also experienced a decline in the 
probability of discrimination, except in the case of financial help offered.  For this financing 
variable, the increase between 1989 and 2000 is 6.7 percentage points for the simple net 
incidence and 26.1 percentage points for the fixed absolute gap. This is a substantial increase in 
the incidence of discrimination.  In contrast, the probability of discrimination declines 
substantially for the other four agents’ actions in this table, with declines of 3 to 9 percentage 
points for the simple net incidence and declines between 10 to 30 percentage points for the fixed 
absolute gap.  
 
Hypotheses about the Causes of Discrimination  
Three main causes of housing discrimination have been discussed in the literature: 
brokers’ prejudice, white customers’ prejudice, and statistical discrimination (see Yinger 1995; 
Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger 2003).  The broker-prejudice hypothesis states that real estate agents 
discriminate to satisfy their own prejudice.  Because measures of brokers’ prejudice are not 
available, this hypothesis cannot be tested directly.  Nevertheless, some indirect tests are 
available because brokers’ prejudice is likely to vary with other brokers’ characteristics. First, 
minority agents are likely to have less prejudice against their own racial or ethnic group 
members and thus, to discriminate less.  Second, prejudice increases with the agent’s age and is 
stronger for men than for women, so older, male agents are likely to discriminate more than 
younger, female agents (see Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985).  Third, the broker who has 
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resources and market power is more likely to act upon her prejudice.  This paper uses whether 
the broker has units similar to the advertised unit and maximum number of people encountered 
by either auditor at the agency as proxies for the flexibility and the size of the agency.  
Brokers also may have stronger prejudice against minorities who have certain 
characteristics.  A higher level of discrimination against younger, black men than against older 
black men or against black women could be a sign that brokers’ prejudice builds on stereotypes 
about the propensity of younger black men to commit crimes. In addition, brokers may be more 
likely to feel prejudice (and practice discrimination) against Hispanics with certain traits, such as 
a heavy accent or a dark skin tone.  
The customer-prejudice hypothesis postulates that some brokers discriminate against 
minority homebuyers in order to satisfy their white clients’ prejudice and thereby to preserve 
their current and future business with their prejudiced white customer base. The share of 
prejudiced whites among a broker’s customers cannot be observed, of course, but we can observe 
where the advertised unit is located, and the location of this unit provides information about the 
likely location of the broker’s customer base. 
Prejudiced whites are opposed to neighborhood integration and may be especially upset 
about the entry of blacks or Hispanics into their neighborhoods when the areas are at risk of 
tipping, which will result in neighborhood racial transition.  Black neighborhoods and Hispanic 
neighborhoods may be closer to the tipping point than white neighborhoods.  Therefore, the 
customer-prejudice hypothesis predicts that discrimination against blacks or Hispanics will be 
higher when the advertised unit is located in a neighborhood that may tip.  This hypothesis, 
however, does not imply higher discrimination against Hispanic home seekers in a neighborhood 
with many blacks, or black home seekers in a neighborhood with many Hispanics.  In the first 
case, prejudiced whites may be more concerned with new black entries than with new Hispanic 
entries; in the latter case, prejudiced whites may be more concerned with new Hispanic entries.  
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Therefore, the customer-prejudice hypothesis is consistent with lower discrimination against 
blacks in Hispanic neighborhoods and lower discrimination against Hispanics in black 
neighborhoods. 
Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) also propose that neighborhoods full of prejudiced 
white homeowners are more threatened by the entry of blacks than are white renter 
neighborhoods, so this hypothesis also predicts that discrimination increases with the percentage 
of housing units that are owner-occupied.  We extend this logic to consider neighborhood 
incomes and house values.  In other words, we hypothesize that the concerns of prejudiced white 
customers about the entry of minorities into their neighborhood increase with house values and 
incomes, and we test this hypothesis by determining whether discrimination is higher in 
neighborhoods where average house values and incomes are higher. 
The prejudice of a broker’s white clients may also depend on the characteristics of the 
minority homebuyer.  White customers may have stronger prejudice against minorities who are 
younger or who have low incomes, children, a heavy accent, or dark skin.  An aversion to 
minority families with children, for example, might arise because of concerns about school 
integration. The broker-prejudice hypothesis and the customer-prejudice hypothesis make the 
same prediction for three of these variables (auditor’s age, accent, and skin color), so the 
estimated coefficients on these three variables cannot be used to distinguish between these two 
hypotheses.   
Finally, agents’ incentives to cater to the prejudice of their white clients may depend on 
their own characteristics.  If a broker works for a large real estate agency, for example, she is less 
likely to be restricted to a set of prejudiced white clients, and an older broker may have a more 
established reputation that is less threatened by perceptions about a single transaction involving a 
minority purchaser.  These examples suggest that older brokers and brokers in large agencies are 
less likely to discriminate.  Moreover, if a broker works in an agency using a multiple listing 
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directory or the Internet to serve customers, she can employ these tools to steer minorities away 
from the neighborhood where the sale may offend hostile white clients and therefore may feel 
less need to discriminate in other types of actions.  
The last hypothesis is that agents practice statistical discrimination, defined as using 
membership in a certain group as a signal about unobserved preferences or constraints that might 
influence the broker’s profits.  Brokers may, for example, presume either that minority home 
seekers prefer living near people in their own racial or ethnic group instead of in a largely white 
neighborhood, or that lenders refuse to grant loans to minorities in white neighborhoods.  If so, 
brokers may believe that showing housing in white neighborhoods to minority customers is a 
poor use of their time. 
As explained earlier, our data set contains information on auditors’ true characteristics. 
These characteristics are difficult to link to hypotheses about the causes of discrimination largely 
because they cannot be directly observed by agents (with the exception of accent and skin tone 
for Hispanics).  Nevertheless, auditors might send signals about these characteristics during their 
conversations with brokers, or these characteristics might be proxies for observable traits, such 
as articulateness or aggressiveness.  Because we do not know whether these characteristics, or 
variables correlated with them, are observed by brokers, we cannot clearly link them to any 
hypotheses.  As a result, we include interactions with these characteristics in our regressions to 
see whether they are associated with variation in discrimination, but we regard these interaction 
variables as exploratory and interpret them cautiously and on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Testing Hypotheses about the Causes of Discrimination 
We test hypotheses about the causes of discrimination through the interaction terms in 
equation (3).  Our results are presented in Tables 12 (black/white audits) and 13 (Hispanic/white 
audits).  These tables only present results for agents’ actions that appear to involve 
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discrimination.  In addition, the results in these tables are based on regressions with a complete 
set of interaction variables.  Virtually all of the significant results in these tables are also 
significant if they are included in more parsimonious regressions. 
The six regressions in Table 12 reveal several clues about the causes of discrimination 
against black homebuyers. First, as the broker-prejudice hypothesis predicts, black brokers are 
less likely to discriminate against black customers in similar units inspected.  Second, black 
homebuyers are less likely to encounter discrimination in similar units inspected, downpayment 
discussed, and pre-qualified buyer for financing when the advertised units are in Hispanic 
neighborhoods (defined as tracts in which Hispanics make up more than 15 percent of the 
population) than in white neighborhoods.  This result is consistent with the customer-prejudice 
hypothesis.22  Third, for more units recommended, brokers who use the Internet to serve clients 
discriminate less than other brokers.  This result supports the customer-prejudice hypothesis.  
Fourth, for qualified auditor for buying, two significant results show the evidence of white 
customers’ prejudice: older agents are less likely to discriminate and discrimination increases 
with per capita income of the advertised unit’s neighborhood.  Fifth, in the regression for pre-
qualified buyer for financing, the probability of discrimination decreases with the broker’s age, 
which supports the customer-prejudice hypothesis.  Finally, black females are more likely than 
black males to encounter discrimination in pre-qualified buyer for financing.  This result 
suggests either that brokers’ stereotypes about black customers do not have the simple form 
hypothesized earlier or else that brokers do not think black females are likely to obtain a 
mortgage (an example of statistical discrimination).  
As shown in Table 13, only a few interaction terms are significant for the Hispanic/white 
audits.  For financial help offered, we find that older Hispanic home seekers encounter less 
discrimination than younger ones, which is consistent with both the broker-prejudice and 
customer-prejudice hypotheses. For downpayment discussed, a Hispanic auditor with a heavy 
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accent faces a higher probability of discrimination than one with no accent, which supports both 
the broker-prejudice and customer-prejudice hypotheses, as well.  Finally, for lenders suggested, 
the negative sign on the variable indicating that the broker uses the Internet reinforces the 
comparable result for the black/white audits and is consistent with incentives linked to white 
customers’ prejudice.  
In both Tables 12 and 13, several true auditor characteristics have significant coefficients. 
For the black/white audits, actual homeowners encounter less discrimination for both similar 
units inspected and more units shown.  Although information on actual homeownership was not 
directly observed by brokers, it may have been indirectly revealed to them during the interview. 
Compared with renters, for example, homeowners are likely to be more familiar with the process 
of buying a house and to know more about the local housing market.  It is important to note, 
however, that this variable is not picking up a difference in true homeownership between audit 
teammates; instead, it indicates that differences in treatment between blacks and whites are not 
as great when both auditors seem to know more about the local housing market (or otherwise 
reveal their actual homeownership).  To put it another way, the signals that come from being an 
actual homeowner, whatever they are, have a larger impact on the treatment of blacks than on the 
treatment of whites.   
In addition, Table 12 reveals that the level of discrimination for both downpayment 
discussed and pre-qualified buyer for financing declines when both teammates were foreign-born.  
Agents may be able to infer an auditor’s foreign birth from something that is said in the 
conversation—or by hearing an accent.  This result suggests that they can make this inference 
and that it has a more favorable impact on black than on white auditors.  One possible 
explanation of this finding is that brokers’ prejudice (or their anticipated prejudice from white 
customers) is linked to black people who grow up in America, not to foreign-born blacks.  
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Table 13 indicates that, for the Hispanic/white audits, auditing experience is associated 
with more discrimination for both financial help offered and lenders suggested. The literal 
interpretation of this result is that when teammates both had auditing experience the Hispanic 
auditor was more likely to be discriminated against.  However, we do not believe that is the story. 
This result is difficult to interpret because neither the conversation between the auditor and the 
broker nor the auditor’s behavior during the audit can reveal anything about the auditor’s 
auditing experience information to the broker.  As a result, there is no reason to believe that 
auditing experience itself triggered more unfavorable treatments for Hispanics than for whites.  
Instead, auditing experience might be linked to the accuracy with which the auditors filled out 
the survey forms.  If so, this result might indicate that improved reporting quality as a result of 
previous auditing experience may be more significant for Hispanics than for whites, which could 
help uncover more cases of discrimination.23  
Finally, we find significant interaction terms for three true auditor characteristics, but we 
cannot explain what these findings mean.  Specifically, for the black/white audits (Table 12), we 
find that discrimination in pre-qualified buyer for financing increases with the level of auditors’ 
education.  In the case of the Hispanic/white audits (Table 13) discrimination in financial help 
offered increases with auditors’ true incomes, and discrimination in downpayment discussed 
decreases when both auditors actually lived in the audit metropolitan area.  
In summary, our results support the hypotheses that both brokers’ prejudice and the 
prejudice of brokers’ white customers are the causes of housing discrimination, but we do not 
rule out the possibility that other causes are at work.  Moreover, these results also indicate that 
the causes of housing discrimination may vary from one type of brokers’ behavior to the next 
and are not necessarily the same for blacks and Hispanics.  These findings are consistent with 
those of Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) for HDS 1989. 
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Conclusions 
Our analysis of the data from HDS 2000 indicates that black and Hispanic home seekers 
still encounter discrimination in the housing sales market.  Indeed, for some types of brokers’ 
behavior, the probability of discrimination is still disturbingly high.  Nevertheless, we also find 
that both the scope of discrimination and the probability that it will be encountered in any 
particular agent’s action have diminished sharply since 1989.  This finding indicates that the 
housing market situation has improved for black and Hispanic buyers over the last fifteen years.  
One possible explanation for this improvement is the enactment of the 1988 amendments to the 
Fair Housing Act, which significantly boosted the federal government’s enforcement powers.  
We also find that discrimination still appears to be caused by both brokers’ prejudice and white 
customers’ prejudice, although we cannot rule out other possible explanations.  This finding 
indicates that there is an ongoing role both for education, which may help to eliminate brokers’ 
prejudice, and active anti-discrimination enforcement, which may help to offset the economic 
incentives that apparently lead some brokers to discriminate.  Finally, we find that the addition of 
auditors’ true characteristics sometimes has a significant impact on the estimated probability of 
discrimination and that these characteristics are correlated with some types of broker 
discrimination.  Further investigation of these findings is clearly warranted. 
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Table 1. The Incidence of Treatments, Black/White Audits 
 
Probability of Action for Broker’s Action White Black Net Incidence
a 
Advertised unit available 0.674 0.667 0.007 
Similar units available 0.680 0.645 0.035 
Advertised unit inspected 0.492 0.457 0.035 
Similar units inspected 0.480 0.411 0.069 
More units recommended  0.461 0.356 0.105 
More units shown 0.435 0.310 0.125 
Follow-up contact made 0.313 0.291 0.022 
Qualified auditor for buying 0.314 0.235 0.079 
Financial help offered 0.586 0.574 0.012 
Downpayment discussed  0.453 0.377 0.076 
Pre-qualified buyer for financing 0.426 0.346 0.080 
Lenders suggested 0.575 0.560 0.015 
Note:   
a.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the share of audit in 
which favorable action was taken for black auditors. 
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Table 2. The Incidence of Treatments, Hispanic/White Audits 
 
Probability of Action for Broker’s Action 
White Hispanic 
Net Incidencea 
Advertised unit available 0.681 0.716 -0.035 
Similar units available 0.740 0.705 0.035 
Advertised unit inspected 0.490 0.519 -0.029 
Similar units inspected 0.501 0.472 0.029 
More units recommended  0.453 0.395 0.058 
More units shown 0.357 0.381 -0.024 
Follow-up contact made 0.338 0.327 0.011 
Qualified auditor for buying 0.326 0.300 0.026 
Financial help offered 0.657 0.546 0.111 
Downpayment discussed  0.516 0.425 0.091 
Pre-qualified buyer for financing 0.462 0.415 0.047 
Lenders suggested 0.627 0.574 0.053 
Note:   
a.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the share of audits in 
which favorable action was taken for Hispanic auditors. 
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Table 3.  Explanatory Variablesa 
 
Basic Variables  
  
   Standard Auditor Characteristics 
    Auditor's age Auditor's age 
    Auditor female Whether the auditor was female 
    Auditor married Whether the auditor's assigned role was married 
    Auditor parent Whether the auditor's assigned role was parent 
    Auditor's assigned income Auditor's assigned monthly family income ($000) 
  
   Audit Characteristics  
    White auditor first Whether the white auditor visited the agency first 
    Audit in afternoon Whether the audit took place in the afternoon 
  
   Agent/Agency Characteristics  
    Agent black Whether the agent was black (black/white audits only) 
    Agent Hispanic  Whether the agent was Hispanic (Hispanic/white audits only) 
    Agent female Whether the agent was female 
    Agent's age Agent's age (estimated by auditor) 
    Agency size Maximum number of people encountered at the agency by either teammate 
    Same agent Whether audit teammates met the same agent 
    Similar units available Whether units similar to the advertised unit were available to either teammate 
    Multiple listing Whether the agent referred to a multiple listing directory for either teammate 
    Internet  Whether the agent used the Internet for either teammate 
  
Auditor's True Characteristicsb  
  
     Auditor's true annual income Auditor's true annual income 
     Auditor's education Auditor's true education, in years 
     Auditor employed Whether the auditor was employed 
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Table 3.  (continued) Explanatory Variablesa 
 
     Auditor foreign Whether the auditor was foreign-born 
     Auditor homeowner Whether the auditor was a homeowner 
     Auditor seeking home Whether the auditor was currently hunting for a home 
     Auditor in metro area Whether the auditor lived in the metropolitan area where the audit took place 
     Auditor experienced Whether the auditor had experience conducting audits 
     Auditor's accentc Whether the auditor had a discernable accent (Hispanic/white audits only) 
     Auditor's skin tonec Darkness of the auditor's skin (Hispanic/white audits only) 
  
Month and Site Dummies  
  
     Month dummies Dummy variables to indicate the month in which the audit took place 
     Site dummiesd Dummy variables to indicate the metropolitan area in which the audit took place 
  
Neighborhood Characteristicsb  
  
     Black neighborhood Whether the advertised unit was in a census tract more than 15 percent black 
     Hispanic neighborhood Whether the advertised unit was in a census tract more than 15 percent Hispanic 
     Median house value Median house value in the advertised unit's census tract ($000) 
     Per capita income Per capita income in the advertised unit's census tract ($000) 
     Percentage owner Owner-occupied housing as a share of units in the advertised unit's Census tract 
Notes:  
a.  These variables define the X vector in equations (1) – (3). They enter the estimations as teammate differences (when teammate values are not 
identical) and as values for the white auditor (expressed as a deviation from the weighted national mean). See equation (3). 
b.  Four missing data variables are created to control for missing values of the auditor’s true characteristics (except auditor’s accent and auditor’s 
skin tone), auditor’s  accent for Hispanics, auditor’s skin tone for Hispanics, and neighborhood characteristics for the advertised unit, respectively.
c.  For the Hispanic/white audits, auditor’s accent and auditor’s skin tone always have zero values for whites. The highest value of skin tone for 
    Hispanics is 3. 
d.  The black/white audits were conducted at 16 sites, including Atlanta, Austin, Birmingham, Chicago, Washington D.C., Denver, Dayton, Detroit, 
Houston, Los Angeles, Macon County, New Orleans, New York City, Orlando, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. The Hispanic/white audits were 
conducted at 10 sites, including Austin, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Pueblo, San Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson.  
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Table 4. Sample Means of Auditor’s True Characteristics and Agent’s Characteristics, Black/White Audits 
 
 White Black p-Valuea 
Auditor’s True Characteristics    
Auditor’s true annual incomeb 2.838 3.161 0.000 
Auditor’s education 15.570 15.119 0.000 
Auditor employed 0.613 0.719 0.000 
Auditor foreign 0.110 0.119 0.518 
Auditor homeowner 0.469 0.446 0.313 
Auditor seeking home 0.065 0.299 0.000 
Auditor in metro area 0.955 0.899 0.000 
Auditor experienced 0.266 0.291 0.221 
    
Agent Characteristics    
Agent black 0.066 0.061 0.657 
Agent female 0.583 0.612 0.170 
Agent’s agec 2.418 2.418 0.974 
Notes:  
a.  p-value is the level of significance for difference of means for whites and blacks. 
b.  Auditor’s true annual income is coded as 1=under $10,000, 2=$10,000-19,999, 3=$20,000-29,999, 4=$30,000-39,999, 5=$40,000-
49,999, 6=$50,000-74,999, 7=$75,000-100,000, and 8=over $100,000. 
c.  Agent’s age is coded as 1=18-30, 2=31-45, 3=46-65, and 4=over 65. 
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Table 5. Sample Means of Auditor’s True Characteristics and Agent’s Characteristics, Hispanic/White Audits 
 
 White Hispanic p-Valuea 
Auditor’s True Characteristics    
Auditor’s true annual incomeb 2.503 2.748 0.001 
Auditor’s education 14.799 14.328 0.000 
Auditor employed 0.667 0.816 0.000 
Auditor foreign 0.164 0.169 0.824 
Auditor homeowner 0.401 0.321 0.002 
Auditor seeking home 0.216 0.239 0.324 
Auditor in metro area 0.936 0.950 0.285 
Auditor experienced 0.272 0.248 0.315 
Auditor’s accent 0.000 0.202 0.000 
Auditor’s skin tonec 0.000 1.193 0.000 
    
Agent Characteristics    
Agent Hispanic 0.077 0.084 0.630 
Agent female 0.554 0.562 0.751 
Agent’s aged 2.336 2.437 0.190 
Notes: 
a.   p-value is the level of significance for difference of means for whites and Hispanics. 
b.  Auditor’s true annual income is coded as 1=under $10,000, 2=$10,000-19,999, 3=$20,000-29,999, 4=$30,000-39,999, 5=$40,000- 49,999,   
6=$50,000-74,999, 7=$75,000-100,000, and 8=over $100,000. 
c.  Auditor’s skin tone is coded as an integer between 0 and 3, where 0=white and 3=the highest darkness degree.  
d.  Agent’s age is coded as 1=18-30, 2=31-45, 3=46-65, and 4=over 65. 
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 Table 6. Tests of the Hypothesis that Discrimination Exists, Black/White Auditsa, b 
 
Broker’s Action 
Number of 
Observationsc 
Basic 
Variables 
Auditor’s True 
Characteristics 
(Differences) 
Auditor’s True 
Characteristics 
(Interactions) 
Month and 
Site Dummies 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics 
Advertised unit available 340 0.066 (0.581) 
-0.009 
(0.947) 
-0.084 
(0.590) 
0.044 
(0.805) 
0.031 
(0.864) 
Similar units available 373 0.347 (0.003) 
0.255 
(0.061) 
0.202 
(0.201) 
0.230 
(0.212) 
0.235 
(0.206) 
Advertised unit inspected 373 0.184 (0.102) 
0.118 
(0.361) 
0.071 
(0.629) 
0.084 
(0.613) 
0.268 
(0.220) 
Similar units inspected 419 0.433 (0.000) 
0.377 
(0.004) 
0.410 
(0.006) 
0.600 
(0.001) 
0.611 
(0.001) 
More units recommended  875 0.310 (0.000) 
0.235 
(0.005) 
0.212 
(0.021) 
0.231 
(0.021) 
0.217 
(0.031) 
More units shown 802 0.370 (0.000) 
0.347 
(0.000) 
0.406 
(0.000) 
0.495 
(0.000) 
0.495 
(0.000) 
Follow-up contact made 340 0.317 (0.015) 
0.065 
(0.659) 
0.100 
(0.551) 
0.074 
(0.745) 
0.191 
(0.437) 
Qualified auditor for buying 355 0.443 (0.000) 
0.549 
(0.000) 
0.417 
(0.015) 
0.514 
(0.029) 
0.697 
(0.006) 
Financial help offered 383 0.059 (0.595) 
0.099 
(0.437) 
0.177 
(0.224) 
0.229 
(0.167) 
0.220 
(0.198) 
Downpayment discussed  418 0.303 (0.005) 
0.344 
(0.007) 
0.391 
(0.007) 
0.478 
(0.003) 
0.486 
(0.003) 
Pre-qualified buyer for financing 369 0.600 (0.000) 
0.640 
(0.000) 
0.821 
(0.000) 
1.104 
(0.000) 
1.143 
(0.000) 
Lenders suggested 376 0.195 (0.086) 
0.026 
(0.849) 
0.077 
(0.622) 
-0.038 
(0.843) 
-0.061 
(0.762) 
Notes: 
a.  The first row of Columns 2-6 lists the specifications of the explanatory variable set. Each specification includes the ones designated by all previous 
columns and the explanatory variable block designated by the current column. See Table 3 for details of each explanatory variable block. 
“Differences” are differences between teammates. “Interactions” are values for the white auditor (relative to the national average). See equation (3). 
b.  The cells of Columns 2-6 give the estimated values of δw from equation (3). p-values are in parentheses.  
c.    Number of observations=number of audits in which teammates were treated differently. 
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Table 7. Tests of the Hypothesis that Discrimination Exists, Hispanic/White Auditsa, b 
 
Broker’s Action 
Number of 
Observationsc 
Basic 
Variables 
Auditor’s True 
Characteristics 
(Differences) 
Auditor’s True 
Characteristics 
(Interactions) 
Month and 
Site 
Dummies 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics 
Advertised unit available 196 -0.075 (0.661) 
0.012 
(0.952) 
-0.034 
(0.876) 
-0.200 
(0.471) 
-0.235 
(0.408) 
Similar units available 229 0.311 (0.045) 
0.305 
(0.090) 
0.037 
(0.869) 
-0.150 
(0.623) 
-0.221 
(0.517) 
Advertised unit inspected 259 -0.119 (0.424) 
-0.102 
(0.532) 
-0.340 
(0.104) 
-0.461 
(0.073) 
-0.440 
(0.210) 
Similar units inspected 259 0.272 (0.061) 
0.292 
(0.064) 
0.251 
(0.189) 
0.124 
(0.601) 
0.160 
(0.505) 
More units recommended  609 0.104 (0.234) 
0.092 
(0.331) 
0.044 
(0.704) 
0.150 
(0.251) 
0.150 
(0.260) 
More units shown 518 0.010 (0.914) 
0.022 
(0.836) 
-0.048 
(0.705) 
-0.119 
(0.422) 
-0.155 
(0.319) 
Follow-up contact made 205 0.290 (0.102) 
0.400 
(0.051) 
-0.015 
(0.955) 
0.239 
(0.448) 
0.320 
(0.337) 
Qualified auditor for buying 250 0.148 (0.356) 
0.062 
(0.736) 
-0.060 
(0.797) 
-0.068 
(0.821) 
-0.075 
(0.810) 
Financial help offered 234 0.822 (0.000) 
0.917 
(0.000) 
1.340 
(0.000) 
1.400 
(0.000) 
1.374 
(0.000) 
Downpayment discussed  280 0.575 (0.000) 
0.498 
(0.001) 
0.506 
(0.012) 
0.439 
(0.070) 
0.438 
(0.082) 
Pre-qualified buyer for financing 235 0.338 (0.028) 
0.313 
(0.063) 
0.217 
(0.297) 
0.085 
(0.756) 
0.110 
(0.693) 
Lenders suggested 227 0.492 (0.002) 
0.472 
(0.006) 
0.507 
(0.026) 
0.509 
(0.096) 
0.695 
(0.038) 
Notes:  
a.   The first row of Columns 2-6 lists the specifications of the explanatory variable set. Each specification includes the ones designated by all previous 
columns and the explanatory variable block designated by the current column. See Table 3 for details of each explanatory variable block. 
“Differences” are differences between teammates. “Interactions” are values for the white auditor (relative to the national average). See equation (3). 
b.  The cells of Columns 2-6 give the estimated values of δw from equation (3).  p-values are in parentheses.  
c.  Number of observations=number of audits in which teammates were treated differently. 
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Table 8. Approximations of the Probability of Discrimination, Black/White Audits 
 
Broker’s Action Net Incidencea Fixed Absolute Gapb 
Similar units inspected 0.069 0.146 
More units recommended  0.105 0.263 
More units shown 0.125 0.305 
Qualified auditor for buying 0.079 0.256 
Downpayment discussed  0.076 0.313 
Pre-qualified buyer for financing 0.080 0.395 
Notes:  
a.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the 
share of audits in which favorable action was taken for black auditors.  
b.  Fixed absolute gap=fixed amount by which the probability of favorable treatment of blacks falls 
 short of the probability of favorable treatment of whites. 
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Table 9. Approximations of the Probability of Discrimination, Hispanic/White Audits 
 
 
Broker’s Action 
 
  
Net Incidencea 
 
 
Fixed Absolute Gapb 
 
Financial help offered 0.111 0.330 
Downpayment discussed 0.091 0.108 
Lenders suggested 0.053 0.171 
Notes:  
a.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the share 
of audits in which favorable action was taken for Hispanic auditors.  
b.  Fixed absolute gap=fixed amount by which the probability of favorable treatment of Hispanics falls short  
of the probability of favorable treatment of whites. 
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Table 10. Comparing the HDS 2000 Results with the HDS 1989 Results, Black/White Audits 
 
wδ
)  a Net Incidenceb Fixed Absolute Gapc 
Broker’s Action 
2000 1989d 2000 1989d 2000-1989 2000 1989d 2000-1989 
Advertised unit available  0.031 0.860* 0.007 0.076 -0.069 0.007 0.119 -0.112 
Advertised unit inspected 0.268 0.607* 0.035 0.057 -0.022 0.066 0.149 -0.083 
Similar units inspected 0.611* 0.690* 0.069 0.091 -0.022 0.146 0.137 0.009 
Follow-up contact made 0.191 0.655* 0.022 0.093 -0.071 0.039 0.108 -0.069 
Financial help offered 0.220 0.706* 0.012 0.113 -0.101 0.054 0.147 -0.093 
Notes:  
a.  * stands for significance at the two-tailed 5 percent level. 
b.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the share of audits in which favorable   
action was taken for black auditors. 
c.  Fixed absolute gap=fixed amount by which the probability of favorable treatment of blacks falls short of the probability of favorable 
treatment of whites. 
d. The HDS 1989 results come from Table 3 of Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998), with a correction of typographical error of the fixed 
absolute gap for advertised unit available. The value in their table was 0.134, whereas the correct value is 0.119. 
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Table 11. Comparing the HDS 2000 Results with the HDS 1989 Results, Hispanic/White Audits 
 
wδ
)  a Net Incidenceb Fixed Absolute Gapc 
Broker’s Action 
2000 1989d 2000 1989 d 2000-1989 2000 1989 d 2000-1989 
Advertised unit available  -0.235 1.483* -0.035 0.038 -0.073 -0.049 0.246 -0.295 
Advertised unit inspected -0.440 0.784* -0.029 0.054 -0.083 -0.109 0.189 -0.298 
Similar units inspected 0.160 0.774* 0.029 0.063 -0.034 0.040 0.153 -0.113 
Follow-up contact made 0.320 1.338* 0.010 0.057 -0.047 0.067 0.168 -0.101 
Financial help offered 1.374* 0.306 0.111 0.044 0.067 0.330 0.069 0.261 
Notes:  
a.  * stands for significance at the two-tailed 5 percent level. 
b.  Net incidence=the share of audits in which favorable action was taken for white auditors minus the share of audits in which favorable 
 action was taken for Hispanic auditors.  
c.  Fixed absolute gap=fixed amount by which the probability of favorable treatment of Hispanics falls short of the probability of  
favorable treatment of whites. 
d.  The HDS 1989 results come from Table 4 of Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998). 
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Table 12. Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Discrimination, Black/White Auditsa
 
 Similar Units Inspectedb More Units Recommended More Units Shown 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Basic Variables       
Auditor’s age 0.041 0.074 -0.019 0.119 -0.009 0.504 
Auditor female -0.486 0.168 -0.162 0.408 -0.229 0.299 
Auditor married 0.315 0.413 -0.027 0.904 -0.052 0.835 
Auditor parent 0.063 0.849 -0.258 0.136 -0.152 0.436 
Auditor’s assigned income -0.013 0.830 0.060 0.070 0.047 0.207 
Agent black -1.664 0.009 -0.279 0.427 -0.550 0.170 
Agent female -0.302 0.387 0.034 0.856 0.152 0.474 
Agent age -0.170 0.494 -0.142 0.311 -0.212 0.172 
Agency size 0.015 0.934 -0.028 0.789 -0.155 0.174 
Similar units available - - 0.022 0.937 0.339 0.279 
Multiple listing 0.464 0.141 -0.184 0.286 0.031 0.873 
Internet 0.808 0.081 -0.508 0.044 0.168 0.572 
       
Auditor’s True Characteristics       
Auditor’s true annual income -0.296 0.074 -0.036 0.682 -0.039 0.705 
Auditor’s education 0.128 0.295 -0.059 0.367 0.075 0.304 
Auditor employed -0.168 0.766 0.018 0.951 -0.059 0.853 
Auditor foreign -0.228 0.783 0.124 0.754 -0.403 0.366 
Auditor homeowner -1.604 0.004 0.089 0.760 -0.730 0.026 
Auditor seeking home 0.864 0.254 0.158 0.683 -0.153 0.725 
Auditor in metro area 0.226 0.845 0.616 0.244 0.866 0.183 
Auditor experienced -0.995 0.106 0.128 0.700 0.311 0.402 
       
Neighborhood Characteristics        
Black neighborhood 0.409 0.326 -0.047 0.843 -0.150 0.569 
Hispanic neighborhood -0.981 0.035 -0.325 0.240 -0.374 0.225 
Median house value 0.001 0.653 -0.002 0.201 -0.001 0.704 
Per capita income -0.002 0.797 0.006 0.451 0.002 0.831 
Percent owner 0.001 0.917 0.005 0.258 0.004 0.425 
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Table 12. (continued) Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Discrimination, Black/White Audits  
 
 Qualified Auditor for 
Buying 
Downpayment Discussed Pre-Qualified Buyer for Financing 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Basic Variables       
Auditor’s age -0.012 0.630 0.024 0.206 -0.001 0.969 
Auditor female 0.245 0.572 0.425 0.188 0.975 0.011 
Auditor married 0.274 0.532 -0.564 0.127 -0.434 0.303 
Auditor parent -0.343 0.344 0.451 0.131 -0.326 0.350 
Auditor’s assigned income -0.003 0.969 0.035 0.512 0.064 0.290 
Agent black 1.027 0.181 -0.092 0.879 0.082 0.907 
Agent female -0.093 0.810 0.534 0.082 -0.066 0.859 
Agency size 0.161 0.460 0.330 0.068 -0.029 0.890 
Similar units available 0.825 0.096 0.520 0.149 -0.366 0.422 
Multiple listing 0.345 0.317 0.250 0.400 -0.016 0.962 
Internet 0.617 0.299 -0.217 0.629 0.275 0.606 
       
Auditor’s True Characteristics       
Auditor’s true annual income 0.097 0.618 0.148 0.312 0.144 0.394 
Auditor’s education -0.003 0.982 -0.006 0.953 0.268 0.042 
Auditor employed -0.552 0.361 0.082 0.863 -0.775 0.163 
Auditor foreign -0.080 0.913 -2.603 0.000 -1.492 0.033 
Auditor homeowner 0.350 0.577 -0.167 0.717 0.143 0.779 
Auditor seeking home 0.969 0.228 -0.655 0.359 -0.538 0.507 
Auditor in metro area -0.459 0.705 -0.068 0.943 0.569 0.639 
Auditor experienced 0.081 0.907 -0.423 0.431 -0.915 0.128 
       
Neighborhood Characteristics      
Black neighborhood -0.837 0.085 -0.170 0.681 0.419 0.344 
Hispanic neighborhood 0.016 0.980 -1.207 0.012 -1.229 0.036 
Median house value -0.004 0.245 -0.002 0.397 -0.003 0.382 
Per capita income 0.047 0.030 0.013 0.383 0.027 0.140 
Percent owner -0.012 0.180 -0.009 0.199 -0.001 0.909 
Notes:  
a.  Each dependent variable is regressed on the complete set of explanatory variables, in Table 3, both in the form of teammate differences (if 
they exist) and in the form of values for the white auditor (expressed as a deviation from the weighted national mean). See equation (3). Only 
the second form of the variable is reported here, since it is the one that tests hypotheses about the causes of discrimination. 
b.  The white auditor/similar units available interaction is dropped out of the regression for similar units inspected because there is no variation in 
the variable when the value of the dependent variable is 1. 
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Table 13. Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Discrimination, Hispanic/White Auditsa 
 
Financial Help Offered Downpayment Discussed Lenders Suggested  
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Basic Variables      
Auditor’s age -0.088 0.006 -0.030 0.224 -0.056 0.058 
Auditor female 0.536 0.316 -0.362 0.353 0.342 0.540 
Auditor married 0.833 0.186 0.582 0.277 0.934 0.102 
Auditor parent -0.026 0.958 0.004 0.992 -0.771 0.102 
Auditor’s assigned income -0.069 0.454 -0.143 0.052 -0.140 0.083 
Agent Hispanic -0.805 0.382 -0.871 0.315 0.336 0.678 
Agent female -0.431 0.448 0.480 0.265 0.503 0.329 
Agent age 0.586 0.152 0.106 0.741 0.130 0.738 
Agency size -0.065 0.810 0.377 0.096 0.210 0.432 
Similar units available 0.050 0.937 0.794 0.120 0.496 0.429 
Multiple listing -0.654 0.269 -0.370 0.382 -0.616 0.231 
Internet -1.270 0.106 0.044 0.944 -1.312 0.033 
       
Auditor’s True Characteristics      
Auditor’s accent -0.979 0.283 -2.663 0.001 -1.407 0.096 
Auditor’s skin tone -0.258 0.538 -0.412 0.175 0.022 0.955 
Auditor’s true annual income 0.991 0.002 0.082 0.754 0.439 0.175 
Auditor’s education 0.342 0.097 0.132 0.440 -0.096 0.641 
Auditor employed 0.282 0.762 0.293 0.727 -0.611 0.542 
Auditor foreign -0.572 0.672 0.245 0.806 -0.450 0.698 
Auditor homeowner -0.936 0.361 -0.898 0.245 -0.077 0.936 
Auditor seeking home -1.251 0.180 -1.110 0.195 -0.214 0.820 
Auditor in metro area -1.735 0.309 -4.030 0.021 0.289 0.857 
Auditor experienced 2.163 0.029 0.836 0.298 2.009 0.029 
       
Neighborhood Characteristics       
Black neighborhood 0.258 0.667 -0.448 0.335 0.470 0.366 
Hispanic neighborhood -2.059 0.069 -1.064 0.223 -1.203 0.202 
Median house value 0.000 0.969 -0.001 0.778 -0.002 0.659 
Per capita income 0.008 0.680 0.018 0.325 0.030 0.173 
Percent owner 0.009 0.473 0.015 0.122 0.011 0.392 
Note:  
a.  Each dependent variable is regressed on the complete set of explanatory variables, in Table 3, both in the form of teammate differences (if they exist) and in the 
form of values for the white auditor (expressed as a deviation from the weighted national mean). See equation (3). Except in the case of accent and skin tone, 
only the second form of the variable is reported here, since it is the one that tests hypotheses about the causes of discrimination. 
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correspondence to John Yinger, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School, 
Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244. 
 
1. These figures are from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2004, 
Table 29), which provides definitions of these racial and ethnic groups. 
2. HDS 2000 was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
and conducted by the Urban Institute, the University of Connecticut, and Syracuse 
University.  Preliminary results from HDS 2000 are presented in Turner, Ross, Galster, 
and Yinger (2002).  This paper builds on Chapter 7 of that report and goes beyond it 
thanks to additional data cleaning and the use of more explanatory variables. 
3. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1999) apply the fixed-effects logit model to the rental 
audit data. They study landlords’ discrete choices and find evidence of discrimination. 
Their work indicates that landlords discriminate against black and Hispanic renters based 
upon their own prejudice and white tenants’ prejudice. 
4. Yinger (1995) also provides a survey of the audit-based literature on discrimination in 
housing before HDS 1989. 
5. For a review of steps to minimize this possibility, see Yinger (1995) or Turner et al. 
(2002). 
6. Controlling for the auditor’s true characteristics does not completely eliminate the 
problem because there still exist other unobservable characteristics.  For an alternative 
approach to this problem, see Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (2003). 
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7. HDS 2000 is composed of rental audits and sales audits, which are aimed at studying 
discrimination in the rental housing market and the sales housing market, respectively. 
This paper focuses on the sales part. 
8. In HDS 1989, for example, some auditors were assigned to be homeowners while others 
were assigned to be renters. In HDS 2000 all auditors’ tenure status was assigned to be 
renter. 
9. The black/white audits were conducted in Atlanta, Austin, Birmingham, Chicago, 
Washington D.C., Denver, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Macon County, New 
Orleans, New York City, Orlando, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. The Hispanic/white 
audits were conducted in Austin, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York 
City, Pueblo, San Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson.  These sites were also used in HDS 
1989. 
10. The ages of the white and minority auditors are close but not identical, so we control for 
age differences in our regressions. 
11. The minority auditor was always assigned a slightly higher income to avoid the real 
estate agent’s suspicion and to ensure that unfavorable treatment received by the minority 
auditor did not result from the lower income. The non-random income difference across 
teammates is not controlled for in our estimations, which might result in understating 
discrimination, but we think that the impact would be small because the income 
differences are small and brokers usually did not ask about auditors’ incomes. 
12. HDS 2000 also conducted some audits that were not based on an advertisement in a 
major newspaper.  These audits are not considered here, but they exhibit similar levels of 
discrimination.  See Turner et al. (2002). 
 
 - 39 -
 
13. A weighing system was used to account for the HDS 2000 sampling design.  See Turner 
et al. (2002).  
14. Because it compares the average treatment of white and minority auditors, δw is called a 
“net” measure of discrimination.  As shown by Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (2000), a net 
measure may understate discrimination, but can be interpreted as a lower bound estimate. 
15. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) also derive an identical measure of the probability 
of discrimination by assuming that there is a fixed percentage gap between Pw and Pm. 
16. A similar unit is defined as a housing unit that has the same number of bedrooms as the 
advertised unit. 
17. A follow-up contact can be a telephone call to the auditor at home, a telephone message 
left at the auditor’s home, a voicemail message, a postal mail, or an E-mail. 
18. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) also study whether the broker asked about the 
auditor’s income, whether the broker asked about the auditor’s housing needs, and 
whether the broker invited the auditor to call back. This paper does not examine these 
dependent variables for the following reasons: asking the auditor about income, defined 
as unfavorable treatment, can be argued to be a nondiscriminatory routine action by 
brokers; there is no specific question about whether the auditor was asked about housing 
needs in the HDS 2000 report forms; an invitation to call back may not be as important as 
other dependent variables and also the 1989 study does not find evidence of 
discrimination against blacks in that behavior. 
19. We define a black neighborhood and a Hispanic neighborhood as a census tract with a 
population more than 15 percent black and Hispanic, respectively.  We have also tried 
20-, 25-, and 30-percent dividing lines, black and Hispanic percentages, and whether the 
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combined black and Hispanic percentage is above 5, 15, or 30—all of which turn out to 
have no or weak explanatory power. 
20. Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger (1998) also consider whether the broker located the office 
in a white neighborhood and whether the broker advertised a unit located in a central city. 
They argue that brokers’ prejudice may simultaneously determine that she took 
discriminatory action, located the office in a white neighborhood, and did not advertise a 
unit from a minorities-concentrated central city. These explanatory variables, however, 
are not included in this paper for the following reasons: first, the tract number of the 
broker’s office is not coded in HDS 2000, which makes measuring racial and ethnic 
composition of the agency’s neighborhood impossible; second, the 1989 study does not 
find any indication that brokers reveal their prejudice through their office-setting and 
advertising choices. Hence, missing brokers’ office-setting and advertising variables are 
not believed to affect our results. 
21. An alternative way to think about this issue is to ask whether estimations that add month 
and site dummies and neighborhood characteristics (which were available in 1989) to the 
basic variables lead to the same inferences as the “full-information” estimations in the 
last columns of Tables 6 and 7.  The answer to this question is affirmative for follow-up 
contact made (black/white audits) and pre-qualified buyer for financing (Hispanic/white 
audits), but not for similar units available (both types of audit).  
22. It is also consistent with the view that non-Hispanic residents in a neighborhood with 
some Hispanics do not want their community to be predominated by Hispanics and thus, 
they would like to accept people from other minority groups, so their community could 
become more diverse and balanced. 
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23. Yinger (1995, p. 24) indicates “some early audit studies discovered that minority auditors 
who encountered blatant unfavorable treatment became upset and were unable to 
complete their audit forms in an accurate manner, thereby invalidating some audits in 
which discrimination was the most severe.” So a Hispanic auditor with auditing 
experience might be better able to complete the report accurately, which could help find 
more discrimination. 
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